Group buying enables collective bargaining opportunity that individual buyers lack to negotiate prices with sellers. This potential negotiation capability has two opposing effects. On the one hand, the prospect of the group being able to negotiate price with its rival forces each seller to lower...

Decision-making processes are studied using non-standard all-pay structures. Our interest is motivated by regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications in which individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the general public. The common features of...

We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear consumption tax which we call a `tax lottery'. Under this scheme, an ad-valorem consumption tax is supplemented with a...

Recently, both theoretical and experimental literatures have incorporated the ability of strategic players to communicate verbally prior to choosing their actions. We design an experiment to show how and why presence and type of communication matters. We use a multilateral bargaining setting,...

This paper focus on the dynamics of organizations. Agents are grouped into three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whom to hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. We study the evolution of political power...

We derive conditions on the learning environment - which encompasses both Bayesian and non-Bayesian processes - ensuring that an efficient allocation of resources is achievable in a dynamic allocation environment where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer...

Prior research on quot;strategic votingquot; has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous,...

Prior research on quot;strategic votingquot; has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous,...

This paper analyses the decision-making processes of heterogeneous agents, when both individual preferences and group actions are taken into account. Under the assumptions of certain topologies of interactions and assuming cognitive and informational restrictions, an agent-based model is...

Share equilibrium was introduced in van den Nouweland and Wooders (2011) as an extension of Lindahl's original equilibrium concept (Lindahl, 1919) to local public good economies. The current paper contains a comprehensive study of the possible share equilibrium outcomes of symmetric individuals,...