We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a...

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on an ex post trading problem in inter-bank money markets. An “over the counter” inter-bank market is modeled in this paper. Relationship banking leads to private proprietary information that causes bargaining failure in such markets with positive probability....

This study undertakes a systematic experimental investigation of the relationship between market power and labor market structure (concentration and capacity conditions) when workers and employers preferentially match based on past worksite experiences. For each tested market structure, workers...

This study discusses the potential applicability of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) for macroeconomic modeling, with a particular stress on the following three issues: (1) taxonomy - what types of agents for macroeconomic models?; (2) scale robustness - how many agents for...

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the...

This paper extends and challenges Maler and de Zeeuw's (1996) acid rain linear-quadratic differential game.

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related...

The paper generalizes a costly state verification model along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinions, and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multilender coalition. In contrast with previous contributions (e.g. [35] and [36]), our model can account for the...

A well-known result from the analysis of the monetary policy coordination of two countries is that coordination of the two policies pareto-dominates the outcome of the non-cooperative game. Hence, both countries will always have an incentive to form a Union when it is ensured that the other...

While competition between firms producing substitutes is well understood, less is known about rivalry between complementors. We study the interaction between firms in markets with one-way essential complements. One good is essential to the use of the other but not vice versa, as arises with an...