Drawing on the work of people with strong mainstream reputations, we distinguish model and theory. We argue that a model may qualify as theory only if it purports to answer three questions: Theory of what?, Why should we care?, What merit in your explanation? We examine the 66 regular articles...

We study the dynamic stability of fidelity networks, which are networks that form in a mating economy of agents of two types (say men and women), where each agent desires direct links with opposite type agents, while engaging in multiple partnerships is considered an act of infidelity....

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the...

The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic game, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium,...

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests its predictions. The model...

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and...

This paper generalizes a costly state verification model à la Townsend (1979) along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinion and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multi-lender coalition. Main results are 1) lenders forming the coalition are neither too optimistic...

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

According to the survey of Current Business (Sauers and Argersinger, 2006), the licensing revenue of the United States from abroad has significantly increased from 1975 to 2005 year, showing that international technology licensing is a very important business action. However, the literature...

This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in dynastic governments.