Narrow search
Showing 91 - 100 of 33,126
Cover Image
Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible
Weymark, John A. - In: Review of Economic Design 4 (1999) 4, pp. 389-393
Sprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147302
Cover Image
The Division Problem under Constraints
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single- peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We char- acterize axiomatically the family of extended...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836463
Cover Image
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Barreda, Inés … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836465
Cover Image
On the stability of cooperation structures
Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002
This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335692
Cover Image
On the Stability of Cooperation Structures
Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000
Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572166
Cover Image
On the stability of cooperation structures
Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002
This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596618
Cover Image
Inequality and Network Structure
Iyengar, G.; Kets, W.; Sethi, R.; Bowles, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
This paper explores the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the level of inequality that can … be sustained among its members. We assume that any distribution of value across the network must be stable with respect … network. We show that if the network is bipartite, there is a unique stable payoff distribution that is maximally unequal in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092255
Cover Image
Sharing the Cost of Redundant Items
Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moulin, Hervé - Centre of Management Science and Production Economics, … - 2012
inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical examples are network connectivity problems when an existing (possibly inefficient …) network must be maintained. We axiomatize a family of simple usage indices, one for each agent and for each item, measuring …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010586211
Cover Image
Sharing the cost of redundant items
Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moulin, Hervé - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 339-352
inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical examples are network connectivity problems when an existing (possibly inefficient …) network must be maintained. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931193
Cover Image
A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the shapely value with limited data
Aguiar, Victor; Pongrou, Roland; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste - 2017
The unique properties of the Shapley value-efficiency, equal treatment of identical input factors, and marginality{have made it an appealing solution concept in various classes of problems. It is however recognized that the pay schemes utilized in many real-life situations generally depart from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057021