In this article, we discuss several aspects related to the entry of mobile virtual network operators. Some aspects, such as entry barriers and exclusionary practices, relate to the entry process itself. Other aspects, such as prices or the characteristics of the entrant’s product, relate to...

In this paper I identify an instance of multiplicity of equilibria, in search markets with production cost heterogeneity. I show that if firms may enter or exit the market, there may be multiple equilibria. I provide a monotonicity property, which is necessary and sufficient for uniqueness....

We analyze if two-part access tariffs solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of Next Generation Networks. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's...

In this paper, we propose a methodology to estimate diffusion processes that differs from the standard practice in two ways. First, we model the nonlinear long-run trend through the Richards curve, which is more flexible than the standard alternatives. Second, we propose a dynamic specification...

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network, NGN. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network,...

This paper develops a model based on switching costs and technological uncertainty, which explains some aspects of the price dynamics of e-commerce. Switching costs and intertemporal cost correlation lock-in consumers. Firms initially charge low prices to build a customer base. If firms fail to...

In this article, we analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream retail market. We develop a two-stage model, where in the first stage a downstream entrant negotiates an access price with three...