We analyze …firms incentives to bundle and tie in the telecommunications industry. As a fi…rst step, we develop a discrete-choice demand model where fi…rms sell products that may combine several services in bundles, and consumers choose assortments of different types of products available...

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network,...

This paper analyzes the impact on consumer prices of the size and biases of price comparison search engines. We develop several theoretical predictions, in the context of a model related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980), and test them experimentally. The data supports the model’s...

This article assesses the unilateral e ects of a merger in the Portuguese mobile telephony market. We use aggregate quarterly data from 1999 to 2005 and a nested logit model to estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of subscription to mobile services. We nd that mobile...

This article assesses the unilateral effects on prices of a merger in the Portuguese mobile telephony market. We use aggregate quarterly data from 1999 to 2005 and a nested logit model to estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of subscription of mobile telephony. Given...

This paper explains four things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price equilibria, where physical shops either compete with virtual hops for consumers with Internet access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with no Internet access. Second, how these price equilibria...

This article develops a model, based on switching costs and technological uncertainty, which explains some aspects of the price dynamics of e-commerce. Switching costs and intertemporal cost correlation lock-in consumers. Firms initially charge low prices to build a customer base. If firms fail...

We analyze if two-part access tariffs solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of next generation networks. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's...

We analyze the impact of network neutrality regulation on: (i) competition between CPs, and on (ii) ISPs. incentives to invest. We consider both competition between ISPs and between CPs and show that, if ISPs can o¤er network services of different quality to CPs, they prefer to sell the highest...