Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political...

Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political...

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum...

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum...

This report describes and evaluates the present state of the Chilean infrastructure concessions program. This program is leading to a complete upgrade of Chile's highway system and has been recently extended to seaports. The main principles underlying the economics of franchising are examined...

En esta nota respondemos a los comentarios de Michael Klein y Jean Tirole a nuestra propuesta de licitar concesiones viales interurbana por menor valor presente de los ingresos (MVPI). En la primera parte elaboramos sobre tres temas discutidos por Tirole: cuál debe ser el objeto del Estado...

When are public-private partnerships (PPPs) better than conventional provision and regulated privatization? And should PPP contracts be structured and governed when this is the case?. We show that the defining features of a PPP are (i) bundling of construction and operation, (ii) private but...

Government guarantees for private infrastructure projects reduce the incentives of firms to perform efficiently, weaken the incentives to screen projects for white elephants, and shift government obligations to future periods. Thus the uses of guarantees needs to be limited, and they need to be...

Latin American governments progressively substituted build–operate–and–transfer (BOT) contracts for government–provided highways during the nineties. Because under BOT a private franchise holder finances and operates the road in exchange for tolls, it is often claimed that BOT represents...

It has become increasingly common to allocate highway franchises to the bidder that offers to charge the lowest toll. Often, building a highway increases the value of land held by a small group of developers, an effect that is more pronounced with lower tolls. We study the welfare implications...