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A Computational Laboratory for Evolutionary Trade Networks

McFadzean, David; Stewart, Deron; Tesfatsion, Leigh - EconWPA - 2000

and evolution of trade networks by means of real-time animations. Data tables and charts reporting descriptive performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134562

Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers and Producers Play

Guha, Brishti - School of Economics, Singapore Management University - 2006

Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality. Returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of intrinsically honest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056810

Population Games

Blume, Lawrence - EconWPA - 1996

Population games are stochastic processes which explicitly model Nash's (1950) mass action interpretation of Nash equilibrium. The mass action interpretation envisions a population of players for each position in the game, and that players are randomly matched for play. The hope is that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407624

Stable Risk Sharing

Dutta, Jayasri; Prasad, Kislaya - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

We evaluate the stability of risk-sharing contracts in the presence of moral hazard. Contracts are rules for sharing … their choice and apply methods of evolutionary stability. We identify stable contracts, which survive competition against … the evolution of organizations to examine behavior in the presence of small, positive amounts of noise. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005132862

Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemon" Markets.

Kirstein, Annette; Kirstein, Roland - 2004

We have experimentally tested a theory of bounded rational behavior in a "lemon market". It provides an explanation for the observation that real world players successfully conclude transactions when perfect rationality predicts a market collapse. We analyzed two different market designs :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296891

Europäischer Verbraucherschutz - Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment

Kirstein, Roland; Kirstein, Annette - 2006

Wir nutzen die Ergebnisse eines Experiments über Lemons-Märkte, um wirtschaftspolitische Folgerungen über die EU-Verbraucherschutzregulierung von 1999 abzuleiten. Die beiden Marktdesigns, die im Experiment getestet wurden, unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Grades, zu dem die Verbraucher das...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296934

Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets

Kirstein, Annette; Kirstein, Roland - 2004

In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational behavior in a "lemons market." We analyzed two different market designs, for which perfect rationality implies complete and partial market collapse, respectively. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296939

Can fear cause economic collapse? Insights from an experimental study

Guarino, Antonio; Huck, Steffen; Jeitschko, Thomas D. - 2004

We study the behavior of experimental subjects who have to make a sequence of risky investment decisions in the presence of network externalities. Subjects follow a simple heuristic – investing after positive experiences and reducing their propensity to invest after a failure. This result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307025

Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2011

We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307240

Honesty, lemons, and symbolic signals

Streb, Jorge M.; Torrens, Gustavo - 2012

Under asymmetric information, dishonest sellers lead to market unraveling in the lemons model. An additional cost of dishonesty is that language becomes cheap talk. We develop instead a model where people derive utility from actions (what they say), as well as from outcomes, so talk is costly....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323274

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