This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not...

This short paper analyzes the effect of heterogeneity of markets in terms of income on the exclusion of markets under uniform price by considering linear demand curves in all markets. We show that more markets (and consumers) are excluded the higher are the inter-market income differences, and...

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private production cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers with heterogeneous values. In this setting, I completely characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. In particular,...

If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among...

This article describes ways to use original texts in the National Russian Corpus as well as news texts for teaching Russian as a foreign language. Two-year work of a scientific group of Higher School of Economics (Nizhny Novgorod-Moscow), which is called CorpLings is analyzed. Special attention...

Many companies supplying consumption goods and services provide their shareholders with price discounts. This paper presents a simple model describing shareholder discounts and consequent market equilibrium. It is found that shareholder discounts resemble many features of two part tariffs. The...

This paper investigates the market equilibrium and welfare effects of two-part tariff competition. When consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line, equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs if and only if the demand of the marginal consumer is equal to the average demand. Entry...

We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on...