We model competition in an emissions trading system (ETS) as a game between two firms and environmental group. In a previous stage, firms endogenously choose their manufacturing technologies. Our results show that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between how polluting the chosen...

In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental...

We model a market with environmentally conscious consumers and a duopoly in which firms consider the adoption of a clean technology. We show that as pollution increases, consumers shift more resources to the environmental activities, thereby affecting negatively the demand faced by the duopoly....

We model an industry that supplies intermediate goods in a growing economy. Agents can choose whether to provide labour or to become firm owners and compete in the industry. The idea that entry is determined through occupational choice has major implications for the economy’s intrinsic...

We model an oligopolistic industry that supplies intermediate goods in an overlapping generations economy. Agents can choose whether to provide labour or to become entrepreneurs and compete in the industry. The idea that entry is determined through occupational choice has major implications for...

This paper analyses the behaviour, influence and role of third parties in tradable permits markets. Following the literature, it focuses on a framework in order to understand how society and third parties react against the firms' emissions due to their participation in the tradable permits'...