For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …

This article gives a brief introduction to reputation effects. A canonical model is described, the reputation bound … result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989 1992) and the temporary reputation result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007 …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private …

maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about … types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect …

maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without … uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of …

We study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in …, whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over …

We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local …