In a 2001 article that appeared in the International Journal of Industrial Organization, Delipalla and O’Donnell derive a formula for the incidence of an ad valorem or specific tax in a conjectural variations oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001)....

In this paper we examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who faces customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from...

The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...

As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.

We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the...

Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the...