This paper is a first step in the analysis of the use of signals of taxpayer's incomes by tax audit authorities. In a very simple model, we consider the design of the audit strategy when the tax authority can commit to it and has free access to a signal correlated with the taxpayer's true...

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability...

In this paper, we present a review of the literature on optimal auditing of tax evasion and we fill some existing gaps with new results. The main contribution is to give a unified vision on the optimal audit policy when the Agency can pool the taxpayers as a function of the main activity they...

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of...

We analyze environments where firms chose a production technology which, together with random events, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies. The cost of the adoption of the clean technology and the actual emissions are firms' private...

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive...