This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The decision process of individuals is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm. We find that the contribution level converges towards the Nash...

Dieser Beitrag bietet eine Einführung in eine Gruppe moderner Algorithmen, den sogenannten evolutionären Optimierungsverfahren. Anhand eines einfachen Beispiels wird die grundsätzliche Funktionsweise dieser Algorithmen skizziert. Darüberhinaus wird ein Überblick über die...

The paper analyzes a Cournot model with two types of firms: Maximizers of profits and maximizers of relative payoffs. It is shown that the equilibrium is located somewhere between the regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the competitive Walrasian (or Bertrand-) equilibrium.

People often don't behave like economic theory predicts them to do. An example for this is the well known ultimatum game, where theoretical results concerning 'rational behavior' deviate greatly from results of laboratory experiments. The paper tries to find out which forces cause the results of...

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walrasian equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the...

The paper presents an extended version of the consumer choice problem. Different from the standard model, prices are not fixed but arise from Walrasian interactions of total demand and a stylized supply function for each of the goods. Three different types of evolutionary algorithms are set up...

Replicator dynamics and replication as used in evolutionary algorithms are, due to their most basic forms, structurally the same. This short note will prove this thesis. Although this finding is clear cut and easy to show, it is of great importance for the not yet united families of game...

This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The dynamic game is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm, which is shown to extend the applicability of ordinary replicator dynamics of...

Non-monotone incentive structures, which - according to theory - are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled...

The paper analyzes a Cournot model with two types of firms: Maximizers of profits and maximizers of relative payoffs. It is shown that the equilibrium is located somewhere between the regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the competitive Walrasian (or Bertrand-) equilibrium.