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Financial Constraints and the Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration

Macchiavello, Rocco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Does vertical integration reduce or increase transaction costs with external investors? This paper analyzes an incomplete contracts model of vertical integration in which a seller and a buyer with no cash need to finance investments for production. The firm is modeled as a "nexus of contracts"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661896

Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion

Thiele, Veikko - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

agent's performance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates that collusion-proofness can require an … inefficiently high payment to the supervisor, and too low powered incentives for the agent. The eventuality of collusion is further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619304

A Theory of Authority in Bilateral Contracting

Ambec, Stefan - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2003

Two players are involved in a joint project during which a decision must be reached. Each player has private information about future profits. Authority gives one player the right to decide first in a pre-defined set of alternatives. In this framework, I show that (partial) authority should be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626734

Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities

Hansen, Stephen; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In a vertical market in which downstream firms have private information about their productivity and compete for consumers, an upstream firm posts public bilateral contracts. When downstream firms are risk-neutral without wealth constraints, the upstream firm offers the input to all retailers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083463

Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem

von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334160

Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427428