In the model of group identification, Samet and Schmeidler (J Econ Theory 110:213–233, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2003</CitationRef>) provide two axiomatic characterizations of the“liberal” decision rule (a person is socially qualified as a member of a collective if and only if he qualifies himself). They impose standard...</citationref>

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are...</citationref>

In claims problems, we study coalitional manipulations via claims merging and splitting. We characterize (division) rules that are non-manipulable via (pairwise) splitting and that also satisfy standard axioms of equal treatment of equals, consistency, and continuity. And we obtain a similar...

We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and...