hold excess capacity not for entry deterrence but for getting higher benefit from other business strategy such as licensing …The theoretical literature on industrial organization has been argued that firms hold excess capacity to deter entry ….We show that co-existence of licensing and excess capacity can be found if the marginal costs of the firms are small enough. …

input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing … faces, it reinforces, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. Furthermore, the licensee's entry augments the positive …We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core …

input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing … faces, it reinforces, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. Furthermore, the licensee's entry augments the positive …We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core …

sufficiently high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the low quality good’s quality is low, both of entry without … license strategy and license without entry strategy are optimum; when cost functions are quadratic, if the high quality good …’s quality is high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the high quality good’s quality is low, entry with license …

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper … we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power …. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more competitive. However, licensing in …

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper … we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power …. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more competitive. However, licensing in …

-part tariff contract. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing when the supplier provides the input to both the licensor and … license its patented technology to an external firm. Licensing transforms the licensee into both a direct downstream … the licensee. Although licensing intensifies downstream competition, the licensor benefits from the lower input cost and …

an 'incumbent bidder' that owns a complement or substitute. With an auction on the transfer (i.e. payment) to the … government, the incumbent is advantaged.If the government regulates the market with an auction on the price asked to consumers …, it depends who is advantaged. With complements, the incumbent is advantaged: it can set a lower price on the new …

government and incumbent have a key role in avoiding the entry of the pirate. We show that the government will not help the … welfare. However, he will let the pirate enters as a follower or as a leader, or encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of …We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, and the reasons and incentives why a …