The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper … we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power …. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more competitive. However, licensing in …

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology … if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is … profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under …

incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore …, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions …

incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore …, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions …

firms can be complex. Moreover, their incentives are likely influenced by the licensing schemes that govern OSS. We study a … three player game and examine how open-source licensing affects competition among an open-source originator, open … interest of the originator for the contributor to invest greater development effort, such licensing can actually be detrimental …

other words, in the benefit they derive from the innovation. In this framework we characterise the optimal licensing … contract in terms of the licensing revenue maximising policy (fixed-fee or per-unit royalty) and sector (upstream and …/or downstream sector). First, it is shown that under a fixed-fee contract licensing to the less efficient industry sector may be the …

This paper examines how the option for licensing affects research and development (R&D) and social welfare. We find … that if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and there is an option of licensing, firms will do non-cooperative R …&D. In absence of licensing, firms will do cooperative R&D for sufficiently small cost reduction from R&D. Whether the option …

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology … if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is … profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under …

possibility of licensing increases both firms' R&D investment is also ambiguous. Licensing with up-front fixed-fee can increase …-post welfare under weak patent protection. However, the results may be different for licensing contract with per-unit output …

strategies such as licensing between the firms doing R&D. This paper examines how the option for licensing affects R …-cooperative R&D when there is an option for licensing afterwards; but, without the option for licensing, the firms will do … availability of the licensing. While the option for licensing reduces welfare for sufficiently small cost reduction from R&D, the …