We examine an evolutionary model in which the primary source of "noise" that moves the model between equilibria is not random, arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We find conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a 2x2 game is selected by the model as well...

The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission...

The present paper is structured around two main constructions, fixed points of functors and fibrations and sections of functors. Fixed points of functors are utilized to resolve problems of infinite regress that have recently appeared in economics. Fibrations and sections are utilized to model...

The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. We propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the contriversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom...

Many local public goods are provided by coalitions and some of them have network effects. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a coalition with more members. This paper adopts the Drèze and Greenberg (1980) type utility function where players have preferences over goods as well as...

The literature on time-inconsistent preferences introduced naive, partially naive and sophisticated as types of agents that represent different levels of unawareness of agents' self-control problems. This paper incorporates time-inconsistent players in a sequential bargaining model. We first...

In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation...

The winner of a battle for a throne can either execute or spare the loser; if the loser is spared, he contends the throne in the next period. Executing the losing contender gives the winner an additional quiet period, but then his life is at risk if he loses to some future contender. The...

In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 78, 2000) could have been characterized by using direct mechanisms.