This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …

vehicles. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and its degree of efficiency depend on the liability regime. …

'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global … efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby group is formed by the players with highest willingness …

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that … of efficiency. …

models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative …

noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core …, a generalisation of the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to totally recursive … remaining players: the stability of core payoff configurations is ensured by a combination of the pessimism of players going for …