Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied, which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal...

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal...

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is...

The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff functions. The main aim of the present paper is to study the coordination problem arising in a not necessarily symmetric minimum effort game with two players. The sources of asymmetry can be...