In this paper I study expectations coordination on the stationary state in a one-dimensional economy. I allow for two sources of heterogeneity: the first concerns the "fundamentals", the second concerns the adaptive learning rules. Specifically, I consider heterogeneous adaptive learning...

[fre] Dans un modèle simple à générations imbriquées, on étudie la coordination des anticipations sur un équilibre à taches solaires stationnaire (ESS) au moyen d'une approche « divinatoire » selon laquelle chaque agent s'efforce de deviner les anticipations des autres en tirant les...

In a simple OLG model, we analyze expectations coordination on a Stationary Sunspot Equilibrium (SSE), using an ??eductive?? approach in which agents forecast the forecasting of other participants through Common Knowledge assumptions. We characterize the local stability of a SSE in terms of...

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is...