In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainity. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...

Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumers' characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In the second-best efficient...

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

I construct and analyze an example of an economy with production and money under conditions of uncertainty, asymmetric information, and an incomplete asset market. For alternative scenarios, which differ in the information available to consumers and firms, I compute the equilibrium prices and...

This paper explores how financial constraints affect intangible investment for knowledge intensive and less capital intensive firms. In this paper, a knowledge intensive firm implies a firm supplying knowledge intensive services which requires the firm to hire highly educated employees. In...

This paper explores how sales and employment for knowledge intensive consulting firms are correlated. I apply theory on cash flow-investment sensitivities, mostly applied to manufacturing firms, to a less capital intensive part of the economy. Therefore the knowledge intensive consulting sector...

The Schumpeterian view on Business cycles treats recessions as a cleansing mechanism and a state where firms can regroup and innovate. Firms need to access finance externally in order to compensate declining cash flow in recessions. Due to financial frictions, the literature proposes that firms...

In this paper we introduce markets for information about assets' payoffs in a two-period General Equilibrium Incomplete Markets Model. We consider asymmetric Walrasian equilibria with endogenous information allocations and analyze the interaction between demand for information and equilibrium...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment...