This paper presents a model of intellectual property contracts. We explain why many intellectual property contracts are contingent on eventual production or success, even without moral hazard on the part of risk-averse sellers. The explanation is based on differences of opinion between buyers...

This paper studies whether board connectedness affects corporate innovation. We find that well-connected boards have a positive impact on innovation activities and quality. The effect is stronger when firms have higher advising demand or face more severe agency problems. We show that the...

This paper empirically characterizes relationship lending using data from more than 20,000 loans of a Spanish bank to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The study analyzes the pricing determinants of loans to firms based on the entire previous bank-firm relationship, allowing for the...

Using a customer-supplier matched sample of US-listed firms from 1980 to 2016, we study the corporate cash-holding relationship between suppliers and their major customers. The key findings suggest that the cash-holding levels of suppliers are positively affected by those of their major...

The Law and Finance account of the ubiquity of controlling shareholders in developing markets is based on conditions in the capital market: poor shareholder protection law prevents controlling shareholders from parting with control out of fear of exploitation by a new controlling shareholder who...

This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between managerial incentives and firm risk using a hand-collected database of 3307 executive year observations. We find that the relation between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk exhibits a nonlinear relationship with firm size: for...

We examine a sample of firms that adopt quot;target ownership plans,quot; under which managers are required to own a minimum amount of stock. We find that prior to plan adoption, such firms exhibit low managerial equity ownership and low stock price performance. Managerial equity ownership...

We present a continuous-time contracting model under moral hazard with many agents. The principal contracts many agents as a team, and they jointly produce correlated outcomes. We show the optimal contract for each agent is linear in outcomes of all other agents as well as his/her own. The...

This paper considers the impact of financial contracting on growth by exploring a model where entrepreneurs initially do Ramp;D but subsequently need both outside investors to provide funds for capital investments and outside managers to operate the firm efficiently some time after assets are in...