This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are asymmetric because the foreign firm...

This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from using tariffs only to quotas,...

El propósito de este trabajo es evaluar los efectos del Acuerdo Comercial El Grupo de los Tres" (G-3) sobre el mercado automotriz colombiano.Asumiendo que la demanda se puede describir como un modelo de elección discreta, se desarrolla un modelo de equilibrio parcial para analizarla cuota de...

We provide a novel (and old) argument for the nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas, based on the famous paper by Hotelling (1931). Unlike tariffs, quantitative restrictions are inherently dynamic. As long as the foreign exporter earns positive marginal profits, he raises their present value by...

This paper develops a spatial duopoly model by taking land consumption and mobile households into consideration and examines the respective effects of a tariff and a quota on an open economy with various price conjectural variations (including Loschian, H-S and G-O competition). The main...

Quotas act as facilitating practices under price competition. Because they relax price competition, they may affect firms' quality choice in very specific ways. We analyze this issue by considering the following stage game: a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a...

This paper investigates the policy active importers' incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade polices in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not equivalent,...

A quota on foreign competition will generally lead to quality-upgrading (downgrading) of the low-quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in average quality, a reduction of quality differentiation, and a reduction of domestic consumer surplus, irrespective of whether the foreign firm produces...

We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government...