stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying … cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity …

guarantee that the Shapley value, being the average of all marginal vectors of the game, is an element of the core. Convexity of … nite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payof each player must receive. The core of an NTU … coalition of players. For cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games) the notion of convexity was introduced to …

convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An …

-building set. Properties of this solution are also studied. To establish core stability we introduce appropriate convexity …

of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined.It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the …

associated to proportionate flow shop problems.It is seen that PFS games have a nonempty core.Moreover, it is shown that PFS … Shapley value and a specific type of equal gain splitting rule which leads to core elements of the PFS game are proposed. …