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special case of cycle-completeness, players join one by one, yielding the Shapley value. A weak form of convexity is … introduced, under which the value is guaranteed to be an element of the core. For games with complete graph communication the … condition coincides with convexity and in case the underlying graph is cycle-free it is weaker than super-additivity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091726
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120
allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326323
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779
are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite … time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650908
In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011087
: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131700