This study examines whether firms transfer income between the income statement and other comprehensive income (OCI) to manage earnings. The results are consistent with managers opportunistically reclassifying income as OCI and OCI as income. Specifically, we find that firms strategically...

Using the Financial Statement Balancing Model (FSBM) from Compustat, we examine whether financial statement data articulate for 10,681 U.S. non-financial firms for 24 years, a total of 92,951 firm years. We accomplish three specific research goals. First, we build the first formal model of...

Verrecchia (1983) investigates a manager's incentives for costly, discretionary disclosure of his information to risk-averse traders when the functional form of prices is exogenously specified. We extend Verrecchia (1983) by deriving the endogenously determined functional form of prices that...

We develop the first general equilibrium exchange economy with risk-averse investors where firm managers can voluntarily make costly, discretionary disclosures regarding the liquidating value of the firm. This extends the discretionary disclosure setting of Verrecchia (1983) by relaxing the...

We model managers' equilibrium strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about their firm's risk. We consider a multi-firm setting in which the variance of each firm's future cash flow is uncertain. A manager can disclose, at a cost, this variance before offering the firm for sale in a...

In this study I use a principal-agent framework to analyze optimal contracting under two accounting standards, referred to as historical cost (HC) and market value (MV), and under differing asset market assumptions. I distinguish HC from MV by how revenue is recognized and in the reporting...

This paper assumes that there are two methods of estimating the value of a firm's assets, called the historical cost (HC) and market value (MV) methods, respectively. It assumes that the true value of the assets and the two estimates are all random variables, jointly distributed as a...

We consider two managers’ sequential disclosure strategies. We show how the lead disclosing firm’s manager chooses his strategy anticipating the subsequent disclosure choice by a second firm’s manager. Prior studies of a single firm offer little insight into how sequential disclosure...