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Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external … controls and the severity of punishment. An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for … corruption, even when citizens “voice” leads to formal punishment with a relatively low probability. In contrast, pure top …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009642357
.According to the authors of the article, the Composite Technique (Methods) to carry out monitoring of the implementation of the AE … towards assessing the extent of influence of the AE NLAP on corruption risks of the legal regulations, on corruption practices … public administration of counteracting corruption in public authorities and local government. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271806
Medicine theft is a leading cause of inadequate healthcare. Audits of public health supply chains suggest that up to a third of medicines go missing in low-income countries, disproportionately affecting those facing greater health risks and poverty. Despite much investment, policy-makers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477597
corruption in professional sumo. In the present paper, we update Duggan and Levitt's study to take into account changes since … January 2000. We find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but reappears in the period …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005004386
Rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. This raises the question whether a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion can still be useful in providing incentives. By highlighting the role of team work in forging information, we present a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765652
In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in … output; when she monitors the agent’s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent’s corruptibility. I find that monitoring … of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577215
free-riding, which are often ignored in the literature. We derive the optimal monitoring mechanism and show that it solves … “assignment problem,” which, coupled with the need to generate incentive for monitoring, prevents the optimal monitoring mechanism … for the success of monitoring is whether monitors can be penalized for false reporting. Without this assumption monitoring …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509636
coefficients. Our paper contributes to the (small) literature on experimental tests of (anti-)corruption measures and adds evidence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146555
corruption in professional sumo. In the present paper, we update Duggan and Levitt's study to take into account changes since … January 2000. We find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but reappears in the period …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998314
might play a role. My paper provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption measures and adds evidence to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005738159