We endogenize location/product specification choices in a spatial Cournot duopoly on the linear market when firms' output entails an accidental harm to the environment. Under a strict liability regime, the equilibrium involves no differentiation if the expected harm is low enough. This outcome...

In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock's rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength...

This paper analyzes liability rules when consumers and third parties/the environment incur harm. Expected harm is convex in the level of output and modeled as a power function. We show that the social ranking of liability rules previously established for the case in which only consumers suffer...

We explore in the French personal bankruptcy process the ways that judges perform with the possibility to discharge all the personal debts in exchange of liquidation of their assets. In particular, we give some empirical results on the determinants of judges' selection between debtors whose...