In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …

In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …

In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

stability of the grand coalition of all countries, depending on the stability concept used. In particular, the core … to the classical model, we find that, under damages in the IPCC range, the core of the resulting cooperative game is …

either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure …

between the methods. There are some properties that an allocation method should satisfy: full allocation, core compatibility … methods from the point of view if they are satisfying core compatibility. We test this with simulation where we add to the … existing literature that we test core compatibility with different assumptions on returns: on normal and t-distributed returns …