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Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - 2011

firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit pre-emption. Learning; Pre …-emption; Innovation; New Markets; Project Selection; Entry Costs; Collusion; Private Information; Market Uncertainty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Strategic Observational Learning

Migrow, Dimitri - 2023

We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263855

Communication in Cournot oligopoly

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2012

information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292012

A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

Mechtenberg, Lydia; Münster, Johannes - 2010

information transmission is possible with unmediated communication. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307664

Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Weiland, Torsten - 2007

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275033