We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes truth-telling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes thruthtelling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...

Nach intensiven Debatten über die Mängel der gegenwärtigen Fusionskontrolle hat die Europäische Kommission den Entwurf einer Reform vorgelegt. Darin wird insbesondere auch über die Einführung einer so genannten Effizienzverteidigung nachgedacht. Die Autoren analysieren, wann eine...

We study how website defaults aff ect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to...

We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to...

We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem-solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal...

We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider...

This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive...

We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal...