We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...

We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate non-trivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow, i.e. the order...

We analyze a nonlinear rational expectations equilibrium model with an ex post endogenous liquidity provision decision. Speed and information technology advantages allow endogenous liquidity providers (ELPs) to switch between limit and market orders after observing private information. This...

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

We examine transaction-level data from Intrade's 2012 presidential winner market for the entire two-year period for which trading occurred. The data allow us to compute key statistics, including volume, transactions, aggression, directional exposure, holding duration, margin, and profit for each...