We provide empirical support for a DSGE model with nominal wage stickiness where growth is driven by learning-by-doing and money shocks and their variance are allowed to impact on long-run output growth. In our theoretical model the variance of monetary shocks has a negative effect on growth,...

In New Keynesian models nominal rigidities determine socially inefficient outcomes. Our paper reverses this view: properly designed monetary policies may take advantage of predetermined nominal wages to discipline monopolistic wage setters. This, in turn, requires accepting a non-zero inflation...

Empirical contributions show that wage re-negotiations take place while expiring contracts are still in place. This is captured by assuming that nominal wages are pre-determined. As a consequence, wage setters act as Stackelberg leaders, whereas in the typical New Keynesian model the...

Recent developments in macroeconomics resurrect the view that welfare costs of inflation arise because the latter acts as a tax on money balances. Empirical contributions show that wage re-negotiations take place while expiring contracts are still in place. Bringing these seemingly unrelated...

Questo lavoro si propone di distinguere le differenti motivazioni che si trovano alla base delle scelte effettuate in un gioco dell’investimento. In particolare attraverso metodi diretti, basati sull’osservazione dei playoff e delle scelte, e indiretti, basati su questionari, si vogliono...

Questo paper illustra dal punto di vista sperimentale come la letteratura ha affrontato il problema della misurazione della fiducia, reciprocità e altruismo (conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences) nel gioco dell’investimento.

Questo lavoro illustra come la letteratura economica secondo l’approccio comportamentale ha affrontato il problema delle preferenze che riguardano gli altri. Si propone di elaborare una rassegna su come le preferenze non egoistiche si inseriscono nella funzione di utilità.

This paper attempts to measure conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences in two versions of an investment game: a canonical one and a cheap-talk variant where some pre-play is also allowed (i.e., non-binding unilateral messages). We find that counter-factual measures, as the...