We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated...

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments...

This paper generalizes a costly state verification model à la Townsend (1979) along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinion and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multi-lender coalition. Main results are 1) lenders forming the coalition are neither too optimistic...

A social game is a generalization of a strategic-form game, in which not only the payoff of each player depends upon the strategies chosen by their opponents, but also their set of admissible strategies. Debreu (1952) proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in social games with continuous...

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two-player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and...

This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin...

The paper generalizes a costly state verification model along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinions, and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multilender coalition. In contrast with previous contributions (e.g. [35] and [36]), our model can account for the...

This paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a partnership as the trade-off between efficiency gains and a 'cost' associated with the partial loss of control over the decisions the partnership takes. For instance, by forming a monetary union, countries benefit from a more coordinated monetary...