This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...

This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its (endogenously derived) size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation...

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Consider a finite data set where each observation consists of a bunde of contingent consumption chosen by an agent from a constraint set of such bundles.  We develop a general procedure for testing the consistency of this data set with a broad class of models of choice under risk and under...

This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity‐sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication,...

We derive necessary and sucient conditions for data sets composed of state-contingent prices and consumption to be consistent with two prominent models of decision making under uncertainty: variational preferences and smooth ambiguity. The revealed preference conditions for subjective expected...

We study the gains from trade in a model with endogenously variable markups. We show that the pro-competitive gains from trade are large if the economy is characterized by (i) extensive misallocation, i.e., large ineciencies associated with markups, and (ii) a weak pattern of cross-country...

This short paper proposes a didactic example on how to solve a multidimensional screening problem in the linear case. In the proposed example, shareholders of a cash-constrained firm propose to the firm management a recapitalization in counterpart of the distribution of future dividends. The...