This paper develops a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model with innovation contests to study the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in...

We develop a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with performance-pay worker compensation and occupational choice. We analytically and numerically examine the distributional effects of entrepreneurial talent and performance-pay contracts. Risk-neutral, more talented individuals...

The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic...

This paper develops a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model with innovation contests to study the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in...

This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments to absolute performance evaluation via piece rates when agents are heterogeneous ex post, to make the point that agent heterogeneity compromises the insurance function of tournaments. In particular, we show that the more...

Grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers. This paper focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to prevent integrator companies from...

Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence,...

This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments to absolute performance evaluation via piece rates when agents are heterogeneous ex post, to make the point that agent heterogeneity compromises the insurance function of tournaments. In particular, we show that the more...