Let G=<I,J,g> be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which players 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively and the payoff is the average per-stage payoff when the two automata face off. We are interested in the cases in...</i,j,g>

The variation of a martingale m[k] of k+1 probability measures p(0),...,p(k) on a finite (or countable) set X is the expectation of the sum of ||p(t)-p(t-1)|| (the L one norm of the martingale differences p(t)-p(t-1)), and is denoted V(m[k]). It is shown that V(m[k]) is less than or equal to the...

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and&sol;or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

It is known that the value of a zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides need not exist [Aumann Maschler 95]. It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of the zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides is...

The paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality, for player i, is reflected in part in the number [psi]i(t) of distinct strategies available to him in the first t-stages. We examine how the growth...