We investigate implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information concerning the state from epistemological perspectives. While each agent is either selfish or honest, they do not expect other participants to be honest. Nevertheless, an honest agent may exist, not among the...

This study investigates a free-rider problem caused by externalities inherent in global commons, industrial pollution, and the hidden social costs of everyday activities. Within the range of sovereignty and privacy protection, to transform the social dilemma into an easier-to-solve coordination...

This study investigates a free-rider problem caused by externalities inherent in global commons, industrial pollution, and the hidden social costs of everyday activities. Within the range of sovereignty and privacy protection, to transform the social dilemma into an easier-to-solve coordination...

We consider the possibility that in a society where innately prosocial and adversarial agents exist albeit in the minority, the majority of agents behave honestly from two distinct perspectives. First, we consider a socioeconomic perspective in which the majority are influenced by their partners...

We consider the possibility that in a society where innately prosocial and adversarial agents exist albeit in the minority, the majority of agents behave honestly from two distinct perspectives. First, we consider a socioeconomic perspective in which the majority are influenced by their partners...

This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents' preferences for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it...

We model the stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs who are not expected to be certainly rational compete over profit by bursting the bubble caused by investors? euphoria. The manager raises money by issuing shares and the arbitrageurs use leverage. If leverage is weakly regulated,...