We study the design of self-enforcing mechanisms that rely on neither a trusted third party (e.g., court, trusted mechanism designer) nor a long-term relationship. Instead, we use a smart contract written on blockchains as a commitment device. We design the digital court, a smart contract that...

This study demonstrates a novel epistemological approach to mechanism design. We consider a type space in which agents are either selfish or honest, and show that a slight possibility of honesty in higher-order beliefs motivates all selfish agents to behave sincerely. Specifically, in our model,...

This study investigates a free-rider problem in long-term relationships, where, due to its non-excludable nature, each player attempts to seek loopholes to impose the burden of cooperation on other players. The players establish a committee that demands that each player select an action as...

We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemological perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest agent who is motivated by intrinsic preference for honesty as well as material interest. We assume weak...

We investigate the implementation of social choice rules (SCRs) in dominant strategy, where the central planner evaluates social welfare ethically rather than financially by excluding monetary transfers from the welfare evaluation, prohibiting redistribution, and putting heterogenous welfare...

We experimentally examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in networks. A cycle path in a network permits a buyer to become a reseller that can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. Theory predicts that the price of the information...

　　 We formulate strategic aspects of speculative arbitrageurs in a stock market as a generalization of timing game with behavioral types explored by Matsushima (2013b). A company raises huge funds during the bubble driven by positive feedback traders' euphoria by issuing shares in...

We incorporate behavioral economics into implementation theory, where each agent dislikes telling a white lie. By using a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented as long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.