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We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993). In every one of 24 rounds 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014134918
A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players $n$, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every $n$-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052202
Within a standard stochastic evolutionary framework, we study the evolution of morality, both at the level of behavior and at the level of codes of behavior. These moral codes involve sanctioning deviant agents. We provide conditions under which the presence of any small degree of inter-group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057443
Suppose a decision maker (DM), in the language of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), has preferences over acts (horse-race lotteries) that satisfy the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) axioms for objective lotteries (constant acts) and Anscombe and Aumann's (1963) Axioms of Reversal of Order and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014039174
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with preplay communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082630
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Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoff-irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188874
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We perform two robustness checks of this result. First, we show that only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027976