Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined with strong union laws are conducive to...

We hypothesize that established firms with innovative projects and technologies will make relatively greater use of arm's length financing (such as public debt and equity); whereas less innovative firms will tend to use relationship based borrowing (such as bank borrowing). The hypothesis is...

I examine whether greater protection of non-financial stakeholders such as employees, customers and the community can enhance corporate benefits to these stakeholders, and hence impact firm innovation, value and capital structure. Using the exogenous passage of Constituency laws to measure...

We hypothesize that corporate income taxes distort firms' incentives to innovate by reducing their pledgeable income. Using a differences-in-differences methodology, we document that large corporate income tax cuts boost corporate innovation. We find a similar but opposite effect for tax...

We examine the relationship between political uncertainty and R&D investment by exploiting the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections as a source of exogenous variation in uncertainty. In contrast to the literature documenting negative effects of political uncertainty on real investment, we find...

Using a sample of 85 Delaware master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) from 2004 to 2016, we examine the relation between cash dividend policy and the strength of corporate governance measured by contractual governance provisions, such as fiduciary waiver, mandatory distributions, and voting...