<p><p><p>Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings,...</p></p></p>

This paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal...

This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of "distribution factors." These factors are defined...

There is evidence that one cannot treat many-person households as a single decisionmaker. If so, then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household. The authors develop a method of identifying how incomes affect...

The neo-classical theory of demand applies to individuals yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members (or even for whole economies!). This paper explores what the theory of individual members of the household resolve conflicts. All we assume is that...

We consider a simple model of competition under moral hazard with constant return technologies. We consider preferences that are not separable in effort: marginal utility of income is assumed to increase with leisure, especially for high income levels. We show that, in this context, Bertrand...

In this paper, household is modeled as a two-member collectivity taking Pareto-efficient decisions. The consequences of this assumption are analyze d in a three-good model, in which only total consumption and each mem ber's labor supply are observable. If the agents are assumed egoistic (i.e.,...