The authors present a new methodology for studying the problem of intrafirm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment. They develop and analyze a general noncooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its...

We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private inflation the customer...

This paper considers why non-monetary means of exchange, such as barter and the reciprocation of favors, are chosen by firms despite the usual benefits of monetary transactions. We consider the chosen means of exchange when both monetary and non-monetary exchange mechanisms are available. We...

This paper studies managerial decisions about investment in long-run projects in the presence of imperfect information (the market knows less about such investments than the firm's managers) and short-term managerial objectives (the managers are concerned about the short-term stock price as well...

The authors examine managerial investment decisions in the presence of imperfect information and short-term managerial objectives. Prior research has argued that such an environment induces managers to underinvest in long-run projects. The authors show that short-term objectives and imperfect...

The authors consider a wide number of applications of an intrafirm bargaining game within organizations where employees and the firm engage in wage negotiations. Under their presumption that contracts cannot bind employees to the organization, the resulting stable wage and profit profiles give...