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Using truels, or three-person duels, as an example, we show that how players perceive a multiple-round game will end can make a big difference in whether it ends non-cooperatively (producing a "bang") or just peters out (producing a "whimper"): 1. If the players view the number of rounds as...
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Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated: i) Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members...
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Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a "hole" in the ordering,...
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Two or more players are required to divide up a set of indivisible items that they can rank from best to worst. They may, as well, be able to indicate preferences over subsets, or packages, of items. The main criteria used to assess the fairness of a division are efficiency (Pareto-optimality)...
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