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agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423852
potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780612
Wars of conquest and wars of independence are characterized by an asymmetric payoff structure: one party gets aggregate production if it wins, and its own production if it loses, while the other party gets only its own production if it wins, and nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754525
potential appropriator's ability. In a game of conflict, securing property can be achieved by spending resources for protection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611055
We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of a prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307000
We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of a prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367856
We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649250
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011637947
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
commitment of donors must not be in doubt. For these conditions to be in place, conflict resolution must be in donors' interests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214496