We extend standard models of price pass-through across multiple layers of intermediaries in a supply chain with imperfect competition to incorporate credit rationing. To test against a standard model without credit rationing, we study the effects of a policy reform in Bangladesh's edible oils...

This study analyses the possible existence of spatial non-price competition in the port industry. We propose a dynamic two-stage model that allows: (1) to estimate the sensitivity of generation and diversion of traffic caused by port capacity expansions; (2) to quantify the degree of capacity...

We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equispaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more easily...

In this introduction, we briefly overview the topics covered by the contributions included in this special issue which, from different angles, deal with the organization and governance of social economy enterprises. Three different approaches are taken by the contributions to the special issue:...

Competitor-oriented objectives, such as market-share targets, are promoted by academics and are commonly used by firms. A 1996 review of the evidence, summarized in this paper, found that competitor-oriented objectives reduced profitability. We describe new evidence from 12 studies, one of which...

We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Then both firms endogenously choose the mode of...

This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The...

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is...

Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associated with perfectly competitive market outcomes: the “lemons” market. Credible certification, that substantiates unobservable characteristics of products that consumers value, is often...

This paper analyzes welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions on demand properties---cross/own elasticities and curvature---for differential pricing by symmetric firms to raise...