A model of first price sealed bid auctions is developed where bidders meet repeatedly while independently drawing private valuations in each period.Attention is focused on symmetric collusive bidding equilibria when side-payments are not allowed.

Dans Cet Article, Nous Presentons un Probleme de Choix D'investissement En Incertitude. au Moment de Prendre Leurs Decisions, les Administrateurs Ne Connaissent Pas la Taille du Marche(Volume des Ventes) Mais Connaissent le Prix de Vente du Produit et la Distribution a Priori du Niveau des...

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on...

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our...

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given...