Accounting for ambiguity aversion in dynamic decisions generally implies that either dynamic consistency or consequentialism must be given up. To gain insight into which of these principles better describes people's preferences we tested them using a variation of Ellsberg's three-color urn...

In Ghirardato, Macheroni and MArcinaccri (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between percieved ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which includes CEU and a-MEU and axiomatise a subclass of a-MEU preferences. We show that for Hurwicz...

In [7] Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. They axiomatize a...

We apply Pires’s coherence property between unconditional and conditional preferences that admit a CEU representation. In conjunction with consequentialism (only those outcomes on states which are still possible can matter for conditional preference) this implies that the conditional...