The scope of this article is to point out how the present financial crisis is affecting the European payments landscape and the Single Euro Payments Area implementation. The current unpredictable and very challenging market situation has not fundamentally changed the fact that payment services...

This paper analyzes the effects of the way information is produced and transmitted through an organizational structure on the business dynamics of a firm. Specifically, I study its effects on the agency problem, concluding that it proves to be an efficient and effective solution to overcome the...

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or investments which produce a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division...

We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. These findings are presented within a costly state verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid...

We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. This is demonstrated in a costly state verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid stochastic...

We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...

We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. These findings are presented within a costly state verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid...

When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project payoff? A typical common stock contract rewards investors in proportion to their initial investment, but does it make the best use of investors' crowd wisdom? By...

This paper studies the choice between building liquidity buffers and raising funding ex post, to deal with liquidity shocks. We uncover the possibility of an inefficient liquidity squeeze equilibrium. Agents typically choose to build smaller liquidity buffers when they expect cheap funding....